The debate over the Turkey–Libya agreement and destabilization in North Africa takes us back to 2012, when, as Foreign Minister, I strongly raised with Libya’s then–prime minister the need to proceed with delimiting a Greece–Libya Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), building on an initiative earlier launched by the then Foreign Minister, Dora Bakoyannis. The Libyans had agreed, but the country’s fragmentation into western and eastern zones overturned the situation.
The emergence of Haftar as the military leader of Eastern Libya changed the dynamics. Although initially presented as Greece’s “natural ally” because of his clash with Turkey, he proved in practice to be an unstable and controversial interlocutor.
After briefly supporting him, Greece chose to recognize him as a principal partner—a choice that proved mistaken, as Haftar continued to act on his own terms and now aligns once again with Western Libya to advance the Turkey–Libya agreement under Ankara’s guidance.
This agreement calls Greek sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean into question at the very moment when Libya—especially its eastern part under Haftar—has become a key gateway for irregular migration. Thousands gather at the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi and cross to Crete, which now finds itself on the front line.
Europe tried to address the crisis with joint naval operations.
In June 2015, at my proposal as the responsible Commissioner and with the support of France, Italy, and Malta, Operation SOPHIA was launched to combat traffickers and train the Libyan Coast Guard.
A few months later, in February 2016, I met with NATO’s then Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, and requested the deployment of naval forces in the Aegean. Thus began the SNMG2 mission, aimed at surveillance and supporting the coast guards.
However, both SOPHIA and the NATO mission were confined to an observer role and ultimately lost momentum—evidence of Europe’s inability to match political will with substantive deterrent action.
Frontex serves as Europe’s “eye” in the Mediterranean, but international law constrains any attempt at deterrence or “pushbacks.” Returns, for their part, run aground on countries of origin refusing to take back their nationals. The result: Europe remains divided and exposed to organized networks that exploit areas such as Eastern Libya.
Greece must take a realistic view of its geopolitical footprint: migration is not a local problem for Crete or the Aegean, but part of a broader chain that starts in Tobruk and reaches all the way to Ankara. So long as Europe cannot coordinate and international organizations remain weak, the crisis will recur in waves. Our foreign policy must be designed not only from the inside out, but also the other way around—with a strategy that coolly reads the environment and serves Greece’s long-term interests in a fluid Mediterranean.