The recent statements made by Donald Trump in Davos—and the renewed threats concerning Greenland or the cohesion of the transatlantic relationship—are not simply another episode of tension in relations between the United States and Europe. They serve as a reminder that the issue of European strategic autonomy, and more specifically that of common defence, remains unresolved—unfinished—and today is more relevant than ever.
This debate is not new. From the very first steps of European integration, alongside the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed. That ambitious plan of the 1950s aimed to form a supranational European army.
Its rejection by the French National Assembly marked a critical turning point. Europe moved forward with its economic integration, but left behind the political and defence dimension.
Decades later, the creation of the Eurocorps was an important—yet primarily symbolic—step toward shaping a common European military culture. However, it never evolved into the core of a truly unified European defence. NATO and the American security guarantee remained the principal pillars of European security.
Here lies the fundamental problem: without political union, there can be no meaningful strategic and defence union. The attempt to adopt a European Constitution in the early 2000s collapsed after negative referendums in France and the Netherlands. Since then, political integration has slowed dramatically, leaving the Union with strong economic tools but weak mechanisms for a common foreign and defence policy.
Today, the international environment is even more complex and demanding. The war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, the intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, and uncertainty about Washington’s future stance are forcing European capitals to revive the debate over strategic autonomy.
Yet this rhetoric is not always accompanied by the necessary political boldness. Many European leaders seem to hesitate in the face of deeper political integration, preferring fragmented initiatives to a major institutional leap.
The question, therefore, is not whether Europe has the economic and technological resources to build credible defence capabilities. It does. Nor is it whether it can coordinate its industries and strengthen joint procurement of military equipment. It can. The real question is whether it possesses the strategic self-confidence and political courage to complete the founders’ original vision.
Perhaps today’s leaders find it difficult to believe in it. Perhaps it will be future generations who are called upon to prevent the closing act of a project that was born as a peacemaking miracle, forged through crises, and granted our own generations the longest period of stability in European history.
What is at stake is not merely the creation of a European army. It is whether the European Union will remain a union of rules and markets—or whether it will finally evolve into a fully-fledged political community capable of defending itself in a world that is changing at breakneck speed.