Libya has for years remained at the heart of a geopolitical equation that directly affects Greek interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
After the signing of the Turkey–Libya memorandum in 2019, Athens sought ways to challenge it or limit its effects. In that effort, General Khalifa Haftar—the strongman of eastern Libya—was presented as a “partner,” as he then appeared to be the natural opponent of the Tripoli government and an enemy of Turkey. Thus a policy line was drawn which—despite warning signs—was revived in the years that followed: Greece supported, politically and diplomatically, a volatile and discredited actor, hoping he could upset the balance and block the Ankara–Tripoli pact—yet this ran counter to the stance of most European partners, who consistently recognized the internationally legitimate government in Tripoli.
To this day it remains unanswered how, and by what criteria, this line was drawn in 2019—a choice that determined the next steps of Greek policy in Libya, narrowing the room for maneuver and dialogue.
Five years on, reality shows how uncertain and short-lived this tactic proved to be.
Haftar not only failed to nullify the memorandum; he has recently tacitly accepted its existence, cooperating with the Tripoli government on issues that serve his own interests. At the same time, Ankara is exploiting a dual track: it supports the Tripoli government militarily and politically, while keeping channels open with Haftar as well, securing privileged access to energy projects and geopolitical quid pro quos.
Greece, by contrast, confined itself to a one-dimensional approach. The initial choice to cooperate with Haftar was at the time understandable, since the Tripoli government signed the memorandum with Turkey, directly contesting Greek sovereign rights. However, persisting on that path—ignoring the dynamics of the European position and developments on the ground—left Athens outside the central conversation about Libya’s future.
Today’s picture is clear:
- International legitimacy in Libya remains with Tripoli.
- Ankara maintains influence on both sides.
- Greece has limited participation in shaping developments.
“Greece must return to the foreground with a multi-channel strategy.”
- Haftar remains a local power broker, but not the decisive “game-changer” the Greek side imagined.
The stakes are high: the Turkey–Libya memorandum remains in force, while energy planning in the Eastern Mediterranean is moving ahead—often without Athens having a substantive say in Libyan negotiations.
At this stage, Greek diplomacy is called upon to take three realistic steps:
First, adjust its strategy toward Libya, recognizing that unilateral backing of Haftar is insufficient and cannot be the sole policy axis.
Second, reactivate channels of communication with the Tripoli government—however diplomatically demanding—demonstrating that Greece can stand as a partner in stability and reconstruction, and not merely as Turkey’s counterweight. Italy’s approach, as expressed through the Meloni initiative, shows how an EU member state can return forcefully to a complex front—without illusions but also without leaving vacuums.
Third, claim a more decisive role within the EU, asking the Union to act in a coordinated fashion on maritime claims and to support the suspension or revision of the memorandum’s implementation. The European dimension remains Athens’s strongest card—if leveraged coherently and in time.
Libya is not a lost cause. It is, however, a field where those who stay on the sidelines lose ground. Turkey understood this in time and moves quietly but substantively. Greece must return to center stage with a multi-channel strategy, realism, and steady dedication to the national interest—without illusions about individuals and without political dead ends that leave vacuums for others.
Geopolitics does not tolerate wishful thinking and sentimentality. It demands a steady compass, flexibility, and methodical work, so that the country does not again find itself unprepared—without interlocutors and without allies.