Article in the newspaper “Naftemporiki” titled: “Europe in the New Geopolitical Landscape: From Soft Power to Strategic Autonomy,” 25/2/2026

Europe stands at one of the most critical turning points in its post-war history. The international system is shifting from a period of relative stability to an era of fluidity, great-power competition, and multipolarity. The war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East, the reconfiguration of power in the Indo-Pacific, the technological revolution, and the energy transition are all shaping an environment in which Europe is called upon to redefine its role.

For decades, the European Union advanced as a normative power, a model of peace, democracy, and economic integration. That model remains valuable, but it is no longer sufficient. Europe must move from soft power to combined power—diplomatic, economic, defensive, and technological.

First, security. The war in Ukraine has exposed the structural weaknesses of European defense. Dependence on NATO, and above all on the United States, remains decisive, but Europe needs its own strategic pillar.

Strengthening the defense industry, jointly procuring equipment, and ensuring the interoperability of European armed forces are necessary preconditions.

Second, energy security. The crisis has highlighted the cost of dependence and the need to diversify sources, invest in renewable energy, and develop interconnections. Energy policy is being transformed into a pillar of geopolitical power.

Third, the economy and technology. Europe stands between the competing forces of the United States and China. It needs a new industrial strategy that supports innovation, the digital transition, and artificial intelligence without undermining its social model.

Fourth, democracy and social cohesion. The rise of populism, the questioning of institutions, and public fatigue constitute internal challenges. Without the trust of its societies, Europe cannot play a strong geopolitical role.

Fifth, enlargement. The European perspective of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova is a geostrategic necessity. A Europe that enlarges on the basis of conditions and rules strengthens stability, but at the same time requires deeper institutional integration in order to remain functional.

Sixth, foreign policy. Europe must speak with one voice in a world of interconnected crises, grounded in international law and multilateralism. This, however, requires harmonization and convergence of views—not the imposition of the will of the larger states. Only in this way can the equality of the member states and the legitimacy of common decisions be secured.

Within this framework, Greece has a particular mission. It stands at the crossroads of three continents; it is a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, an energy and transit hub, and a country with a deep European identity. It can serve as Europe’s bridge to the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeastern Europe.

For precisely this reason, Greek strategy cannot be reduced to absolute alignment that narrows room for maneuver and weakens the ability to defend the national interest. Participation in the European and Euro-Atlantic core is non-negotiable. It is one thing to be firmly anchored in alliances of values and security, and quite another to practice a self-limiting diplomacy that turns a country into a passive observer of developments.

Greece needs principled flexibility, commitment to international law and European cohesion, but also the ability to maintain functional channels with major powers whenever this serves the national interest.

In relations with Russia, the European position is clear for as long as the violation of the rules continues. This, however, does not mean the abolition of diplomacy, nor the burning of bridges that may prove useful in a future European architecture of peace.

In Budapest, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that states seek to maintain balanced relations with major powers on the basis of their national interest, even when they do not fully align with the priorities of their allies. This observation confirms that diplomatic flexibility is an element of strategy, not a deviation from it.

Likewise, in relation to China, realism is required, along with the protection of critical infrastructure and alignment with the European security framework. At the same time, Europe must make use of opportunities in sectors such as shipping, trade, tourism, and logistics, where no strategic interests are compromised. In a multipolar world, the aim is to remain firm in principles and flexible in choices.

The same logic of balance that is recognized as legitimate for other states can also serve Greece as a tool for strengthening its international position, without calling into question its European and Euro-Atlantic orientation.

The crucial question is not whether Europe will have a role in the new geopolitical landscape, but what kind of role it will choose: an economic giant with limited political power, or a strategic actor with confidence and unity. The answer depends on the willingness of the member states to share sovereignty where common action is required.

The history of European integration shows that every crisis leads to a step forward.

Today, we are called upon to build a Europe of security, energy, technology, and strategic maturity—a Europe that will not abandon its value-based foundations, namely democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, but will instead transform them into a source of real power.

This course is not predetermined. It will be shaped by whether Europe chooses unity, strategic thinking, and political maturity.

Dimitris Avramopoulos
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