NATO today stands at one of the most critical turning points in its history. The latest developments on the international stage—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the deterioration of relations between the West and Russia, instability in the Middle East, China’s rise as a strategic competitor, and political uncertainty in the United States—are shaping an environment in which the Alliance is being forced to redefine its role, priorities, and internal balances. Despite public declarations of cohesion, NATO’s internal unity cannot be taken for granted. The Eastern Flank is primarily concerned about Russia; the Southern Flank faces pressure from migration, terrorism, and instability in the Mediterranean; while the United States is increasingly turning its attention toward China. These differing geopolitical perspectives among member states create a complex mosaic that requires skillful management.
At the same time, the possibility of changes in the American stance toward the Alliance is the single most important source of uncertainty. Even if NATO, institutionally, cannot be weakened by any one administration, politically a shift in the level of U.S. commitment would have an enormous impact on the credibility of deterrence. That is why the debate about the future of the American presence in Europe is not a theoretical exercise, but an existential challenge for the Alliance.
The European Union, despite frequent references to strategic autonomy, continues to rely on the United States for its security. The war in Ukraine exposed the gaps in European defense: a strong economy, but insufficient hard-power instruments to confront a major conflict. The question of whether Europe can—or wishes to—assume a greater share of responsibility within NATO remains open and decisive.
Whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine, the NATO–Russia relationship has changed irreversibly. Moscow will continue to view the Alliance as a strategic adversary; it will seek to exploit any internal fault line; and it will invest in tools of hybrid competition, from energy to disinformation. At the same time, the Eastern Mediterranean is once again emerging as a region of paramount importance for NATO, due to conflicts in the Middle East, instability in North Africa, energy considerations, and vital maritime routes. In this context, Greece has the potential to strengthen its position as a pillar of stability and connectivity.
All of this leads to one central conclusion: NATO is not heading toward its end, but toward a period of profound adaptation. The Alliance’s survival and strengthening will depend on three decisive factors: the consistency of the United States, Europe’s willingness to shoulder greater responsibility, and NATO’s ability to manage crises on its periphery—from Ukraine to the Eastern Mediterranean. In a world that is becoming increasingly unpredictable, the Alliance remains necessary—but only if it can adapt to new realities and avoid the fragmentation that is already visible on the horizon.