The debate over Libya and the Turkey–Libya memorandum reminds us that nothing about this is accidental—or new.
Back in 2012, when I visited Libya as Foreign Minister, it was agreed with the country’s then–Prime Minister that we would proceed to delimit a Greece–Libya Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
It was a strategic move that, had it been completed, would have left little room for today’s Turkish intervention. But Libya split into two zones: a Western one, recognized by the UN, EU, and NATO, and an Eastern one under the controversial Field Marshal Haftar.
Haftar, briefly presented as a “friend of Greece” because he clashed with Turkey, proved to be an unreliable interlocutor. He worked with Russian mercenaries to besiege Tripoli and today marches in step with the official government to implement the Turkey–Libya agreement under Ankara’s guidance.
This agreement impinges on Greek sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean and tests the limits of our diplomatic leverage. At the same time, Eastern Libya has become a main gateway for irregular migration. From the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi, thousands depart and reach Crete, which now finds itself on the front line.
In reality, Libya is practically unguarded: criminal networks exploit the chaos, while Europe itself appears unable to mount a substantive response.
Europe did attempt solutions. As Commissioner, I proposed Operation SOPHIA (the deployment of French, Italian, and Maltese vessels to combat smugglers and train the Libyan Coast Guard). Later, NATO—after my meeting with Secretary-General Stoltenberg—deployed naval forces in the Aegean.
Both missions, however, ended up confined to an observer role—evidence of a Europe that never paired political will with deterrent power.
Frontex monitors the entire Mediterranean by satellite, but it cannot carry out pushbacks because international law prohibits them. And when asylum applications are rejected, countries of origin refuse to take their nationals back. Thus the crisis is perpetuated.
Migration, then, is not a local problem for Crete or the Aegean. It is a link in a long chain that begins in Eastern Libya, passes through Syria, and ends in Ankara.
Greece must shape its policy with its gaze not only inward but outward as well: understanding its neighborhood, knowing who its real counterparts are, and safeguarding its national interests over the long term.
The solution will not come if we leave the international community on the sidelines. The UN and NATO must take a clear stand—yet today we see how weak multilateral diplomacy has become.
From Cyprus to Ukraine, resolutions remain on paper. If we revert to narrow national policies and the hard interests of the major players, destabilization will only grow.
Greece must keep sight of the big picture: from who controls Libya’s ports to who sets the rules in the Aegean.
Foreign policy is judged by outcomes. The Haftar episode shows how dangerous it is to bet on uncertain “friends.” And migration, which superficially appears purely humanitarian, is evolving into a frontline national issue.
If Europe does not rediscover will and unity, Greece will have to invest realistically in its alliances and fortify the fundamentals that keep it standing in a fluid Mediterranean. Geography, after all, does not change. Only strategy does—and that is our responsibility.