The images from Ceuta are not merely images of yet another migration crisis at Europe’s borders. They are a warning. And this time, Europe must heed that warning before it is too late.
Nearly a decade after the major migration crisis of 2015–2016, migration has forcefully returned to the forefront of the European political agenda, albeit within a different and far more complex geopolitical environment.
The issue is not simply how many people crossed the border into Ceuta. Nor should the discussion be confined to Spain’s domestic political debate.
The real question is whether Europe is now capable of effectively protecting its external borders and, above all, whether it can prevent migratory movements from being used as instruments of political and geopolitical pressure.
During my tenure at the European Commission, when Europe was confronted with the largest refugee and migration crisis of recent decades, I visited the Union’s external borders on numerous occasions, including those of Spain.
The fundamental conclusion was already clear at the time: the borders of Spain, Greece, and Italy are not merely national borders. They are European borders.
It was precisely this understanding that gave rise to the political decision to substantially strengthen Frontex and establish the European Border and Coast Guard. Without secure external borders, there can be no Schengen. And without Schengen, one of the European Union’s greatest political, social, and economic achievements is placed at risk.
There is, however, a reality that must now be fully understood: migration is not a temporary crisis that will eventually pass.
It will remain with us for many years to come and will periodically intensify as armed conflicts, instability, poverty, and social disintegration continue to spread across Europe’s wider neighbourhood, and as the root causes that force millions of people to leave their countries remain unaddressed.
Today, these causes are compounded by the growing impact of climate change, demographic pressures, and profound economic and social inequalities.
As long as these underlying causes persist, migration routes may change, but migratory pressures will continue.
For this reason, border management, necessary though it is, is not sufficient.
Europe needs a policy that begins long before migrants reach its borders: active diplomacy to prevent and resolve conflicts, development cooperation, investment, support for the economic and institutional stability of countries of origin, and genuine, credible partnerships with countries of transit.
There is, however, another particularly troubling dimension. Europe has already experienced the instrumentalisation of migration. Third countries may increasingly view migration not only as a humanitarian or social issue but also as a means of exerting pressure on the European Union.
If it is confirmed that the events in Ceuta are linked to broader geopolitical disputes, then this is not merely a Spanish issue. It concerns Europe as a whole. And Europe’s response must be common, consistent, and genuinely European.
This does not, however, mean a return to internal borders.
It would be a strategic mistake for Europe to respond to pressure on its external borders by erecting new barriers within its own territory. Schengen must be protected, not dismantled.
The response should be precisely the opposite: stronger protection of the external borders; a greater European presence wherever pressure arises; effective returns of those who are not entitled to international protection; legal migration pathways where these serve the genuine needs of the European economy; and far more coherent agreements with countries of origin and transit.
At the same time, Europe must preserve its humanitarian and democratic character. Protecting borders and protecting human life are not contradictory objectives. They can—and indeed must—go hand in hand.
Finally, there is a political reality that should not be underestimated. Whenever democratic governments appear unable to manage migration effectively, the resulting political vacuum is filled by extremist forces. Fear turns into insecurity, insecurity into anger, and anger into political radicalisation.
This is why migration is no longer merely a question of border management. It is a matter of social cohesion, public trust in institutions, and ultimately the political stability of Europe’s democracies.
In 2015, Europe was taken by surprise. Today, it no longer has that excuse.
It possesses greater experience, stronger institutions, and the very instruments that were created in response to that crisis. What is needed now is political will, European solidarity, foresight, and determination.
Because protecting the external borders is neither a policy of the Right nor of the Left. It is a prerequisite for ensuring that Europe remains open within its internal borders, secure at its external borders, and faithful to its values.
Above all, we must remember one lesson that the experience of recent years has demonstrated with absolute clarity:
Migration cannot be effectively addressed once people have already reached Europe’s borders. Real policy begins much earlier.